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IDEAS are what economists call a “public good.”  Unlike more tangible objects, they are 
free to circulate and spread.  As Thomas Jefferson wrote, “that ideas should freely 
spread from one to another over the globe…seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all 
space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, 
move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive 
appropriation.”
1   
  Yet most nations have adopted laws which work to restrain this free diffusion.  
Patent laws aim to create a property right to the industrial application of new ideas and 
confer to one person or firm an exclusive monopoly to their use.  These temporal 
monopolies yield benefits for the patent holder and costs to society.  Although anti-
patent movements over the centuries have argued that the social costs of private 
monopolies are dominant, patent laws have been justified as balancing social costs with 
substantial social benefits.  Primary among these, patent proponents have long argued, 
is that patent laws increase incentives to invest in a privately risky but socially desirable 
enterprise: inventive and innovative activity.  The result is that in most countries over 
the past two hundred odd years patent laws have been adopted, sustained, and 
strengthened.   
Although nineteenth century advocates also argued that inventors had a “natural 
right” to their inventions, the economic rationale has typically been the central argument 
of policy makers at those historical moments when national patent laws have been 
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1 From his 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson, quoted in David, 1992, p. 1.   2
adopted or reformed.
2  It has also been taken up recently by economic historians who 
argue that property rights institutions play a crucial role in shaping incentives (or 
disincentives) to invest in productive activities.
3   
  Yet the primary focus of this argument has been on the relationship between 
patent law and incentives to invent new technologies—the concern foremost on the 
minds of policy makers and inventors in the early industrializers, especially England 
and the U.S. from the late eighteenth through the late nineteenth centuries, as well as for 
academic analysts interested in those cases.   
What if, in a nation seeking to stimulate technological progress, domestic 
invention is not the primary source of new technology?  The late-industrializing nations 
of the nineteenth century, especially those with relatively low levels of human capital 
and a relatively backward state of existing productive technology, saw technology 
transfer as the primary path to economic progress.
4  For nations in such circumstances, 
was awarding monopoly rights to new technologies necessary to attract technology 
imports?  Would patent rights, in other words, increase incentives to invest in 
technology transfer sufficiently to overcome the social cost of the temporal monopolies 
in the same way that patents’ proponents argued they increased incentives to invest in 
inventive activity? 
  Despite the fact that governments in many nations around the world adopted 
some form of codified patent law in the nineteenth century, all were not alike.  All 
sought in some fashion to encourage investment in new technologies.  However, as this 
paper argues, there existed a fundamental division between those systems which favored 
inventive activity and those which favored innovative activity.  Those in the latter 
category tended to be late industrializers, and their patent laws recognized that the most 
likely source of novel technologies was from abroad.
5   
This paper thus explores the nature and implications of nineteenth century patent 
law in two late-industrializing countries: Spain and Mexico.  Both inherited earlier 
ancien regime monopoly practices, both adopted aspects of modern, codified patent 
systems in the early nineteenth century, and both sought primarily to encourage 
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innovation and especially the introduction of foreign techniques.  Mexico, however, 
abandoned this orientation in 1890 in favor of an emphasis on supporting inventive 
activity while Spain retained this orientation until recently.  After presenting an 
overview of the conceptual and historical issues regarding comparative patent systems 
in section one; section two compares the nature of the Spanish and Mexican systems in 
the nineteenth century; while sections three and four examine the implications of patent 
law: its impact on trends in patenting behavior and—more tentatively—its probable 
consequences for investment in technological change.   
 
II. Comparative Legal Systems 
 
IF THE FAMILIAR justification for patent law has been as an incentive to invest in 
inventive activity, this was not always the case.  The roots of the modern patent system 
lie in the European ancien regime practice of conferring monopoly rights to those who 
promised to introduce or undertake a novel economic activity.  From at least the 
fifteenth century, monarchs and local rulers in Italy, France, England, Spain, and 
elsewhere granted such privileges in order to favor and protect new industry and to raise 
revenue.
6  Some, like the early Venetian system, based conferral on novelty and utility, 
while others rested more closely on royal favor and patronage.  Either way, ancien 
regime practice typically conferred privileges rather than rights, sought primarily to 
encourage the introduction and commercialization of new techniques and activities from 
abroad, and thus favored innovation over invention.  The practice of conferring and 
administrating such privileges was rarely codified, and consequently privileges were 
discretionary in their allocation, broad in their scope, and vague in their specification.  
They formed one part of a broader set of mercantilist practices which included monetary 
awards, bounties, licenses, and charters.   
  Out of this traditional practice, the modern patent system emerged by the end of 
the eighteenth century.  In England it evolved in common law following the 1624 
Statute of Monopolies and was legislated in France (1791) and the United States 
(1793).
7   In contrast to ancien regime practice, modern systems reduced or eliminated 
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room for discretion by establishing formal rules concerning the allocation, 
administration, and adjudication of patent rights and generally narrowed the criteria of 
what was patentable to new products and processes.  They also fixed the term and the 
fees for patenting and made some provision for the publication of patent applications.  
In short, they promised temporal monopoly rights to anyone who met the criteria 
specified by law upon application and payment of set fees.     
  Such “modern” systems moved towards conferring property rights rather than 
privileges.  These systems codified inventors’ right to the exclusive use of their 
inventions while ensuring that society would also benefit: first, through the public 
disclosure of new knowledge and second, by the encouragement of further invention.  
Potential inventors would be less likely to invest in inventive activity, the logic goes, 
without the additional security of monopoly rewards.
8  Policy-makers believed it was 
desirable to encourage inventive activity and argued that monopoly privileges were the 
best way to do it.  Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the vast majority of 
countries around the world had adopted some form of these modern patent systems.
9 
  Yet not all nineteenth century patent systems were cast in the same mold.  Some, 
like those of England, France, and the United States, replaced the ancien bias on 
innovation with an emphasis on genuine invention.
10  In these countries, specific clauses 
of the new laws specified and strengthened the rights of inventors.  These could include, 
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8 Penrose, 1951, p. 17.  This logic was stated succinctly in 1624 by Sir Edward Coke, who played a 
central role in drafting the English Statute of Monopolies:  It is “because the inventor bringeth to and for 
the Commonwealth a new manufacture by his invention, cost and charges, and therefore is reason, that he 
should have a privilege for his reward (and the encouragement of others the like) for a convenient time.”  
Quoted in Boehm, p. 17.  It was repeated in the 1790s by Jeremy Benthem, among others; see Stark, 
1965, pp. 62-66.  
9 See Penrose, 1951, pp. 12-13, 39; Kingsley and Persson, 1848; United Nations, 1975, annex I; Sáiz, 
1999b, p. 74.   
10 The US law of 1793 did this decisively.  England’s nineteenth century patent system presents 
something of a hybrid, in part because it evolved haphazardly over several centuries of common law 
cases.  It allowed protection to those who might introduce a new technology, but it is unclear whether this 
was significant.  Notably, of the three recent major studies of English patent law (MacLeod on the 18
th 
century, Dutton on the 19
th century, and Boehm on the 19
th and 20
th centuries) only one mentions 
introduction patents.  Boehm suggests that they might be an anomalous holdover from previous (16
th 
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for instance, conferring patent rights to only the actual inventor, narrowing the criteria 
for patentability to new technological advances, allowing patentees priority over 
improvements, and instituting examinations for novelty.  Such systems sought to 
strengthen the rights of inventors and left innovation largely up to market forces.   
Promoting the introduction of foreign technology was at best a secondary goal to 
encouraging domestic invention.   
Meanwhile, other countries retained an emphasis on domestic innovation even 
while adopting other aspects of ‘modern’ nineteenth century patent institutions.  This 
was the tendency in countries intent on catching up to the early industrializers.  They 
adopted codified and impersonally administered systems, they created de jure and 
protected inventors’ rights, but they sought above all to encourage the importation and 
innovation of novel foreign techniques.  Specifically, these countries often offered 
“patents of introduction,” a codified version of ancien privileges.
11  Usually (although 
not always) limited in duration and definition, these patents allowed any third party to 
solicit and receive monopoly rights to exploit a new technology or activity not yet 
known in the country, whether or not they were the actual inventor.
12  L a t e -
industrializing countries were also more likely to include compulsory working or 
licensing clauses in their patent laws, as well as other restrictions on inventors’ and 
patentees’ rights, designed to promote innovation.  Compulsory use regulations also 
ensured that patents for technologies manufactured abroad could not be used as 
exclusive import monopolies.   
  These two types of nineteenth century patent systems do not accurately mirror 
any one national system.  There was in fact a broad spectrum of variation among 
national laws, as nineteenth century advocates of international uniformity quickly 
realized.
13  But these two types do reflect an essential divergence in intent and mirror 
the different perspectives of policy-makers’ on the requisites of economic progress in 
their respective countries.  They also reflect the relative position of countries vis-à-vis 
the leading edge of industrial technology.  In other words, the difference between 
systems favoring invention and those favoring innovation typically marked the division 
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between technology exporters and technology importers.  Technology exporters, like the 
United States and England, tended to adopt patent systems that protected the rights of 
inventors.  In contrast, technology importers, like Spain and Mexico, adopted the form 
of modern patent law first established in the early-industrializing, technology-exporting 
countries, but tended to balance the protection of inventors’ rights with an emphasis on 
the commercial innovation of technologies, especially those from abroad.
14   
  Although there is a relatively large literature on the nature of patent systems in 
the early-industrializers, there is scant analytical work on the comparative nature and 
implications of patent systems in nineteenth century follower countries.
15  Spain and 
Mexico provide instructive case studies for several reasons.  First, both are late 
industrializers relative to England and the U.S.  Although parts of Spain (especially 
Catalonia) experienced some industrialization in the early nineteenth century, the more 
sustained phase of early (if still halting and problematic) industrialization came for both 
in the second half of the century.
16  Second, both industrialization experiences were 
based heavily on imported technology, raising the question of the relationship between 
policy and investment.
17  Third, both began the nineteenth century with the same legal 
regime, focused primarily on innovation.  However, Mexican law underwent substantial 
reform after 1890, making possible an interesting comparison between legal types and 
an analysis of the importance of legal reform.  Fourth, data on patent law and patenting 
is available for both countries.
18  Finally, we should note that the following discussion 
outlines the formal provisions of legal policy.  However the patent institution (like any), 
involves the rules and norms by which formal law is interpreted through the daily 
practice of administrative, allocative, and adjudicatory procedures, in both the 
government bureaucracy and the courts.  These issues are touched on briefly below.   
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1. Spain  
  Since at least 1478 the Spanish Crown granted royal privileges to those who 
might invent or introduce a new idea or new activity.
19  Together with other forms of 
rewards and protection, these royal grants constituted discretionary and uncodified 
compensation for investment in invention or the introduction of novel activities.  In 
1811, however, Napoleon exported the French patent code of 1791 to Spain as the basis 
for that nation’s first modern patent system.  Not until the 1820s, however, did political 
stability allow for the codification of a domestic patent system that would endure in its 
essential characteristics through the rest of the nineteenth century.  The decrees of 1820 
and 1826 together with the laws of 1878 and 1902 established the foundation for the 
Spanish system.  Throughout the century it retained its basic characteristics, outlined 
briefly in TABLE 1.  Two of these features warrant further discussion. 
  First, throughout the century Spanish law offered protection to both new 
inventions as well as to the introduction of novel activities.  “All who invent, perfect, or 
introduce a branch of industry,” the law of 1820 began, “have the right to their property 
for a term and under the conditions indicated in this law.”
20  Each successive law took 
pains to specify the criteria for an invention, with increasing specification but little 
significant difference from one to the next.  The 1820 law defined an inventor as “aquel 
que hace por primera vez una cosa que hasta entonces no se habia hecho…el que idee 
una máquina, aparato, ó procedimiento desconocido.”  The language of the 1878 law 
offered this definition of invention: “Las máquinas, aparatos, instrumentos, 
procedimientos ú operaciones mecánicas ó químicas que en todo ó en parte sean de 
propia invención y nuevos.”  Inventions, then, had to be discrete technological advances 
of products or processes, and protection was limited to the actual inventor.   
  Each law also offered patent protection to introductions.  Patents of introduction 
offered monopoly rights to any person who would commercialize a machine, apparatus, 
instrument, process, or mechanical operation that, in the words of the 1826 law, “no 
esten establecidos del mismo modo y forma en estos Reinos” (or, in the language of 
1878, that “no se hallen establecidos ó practicados…en los dominios españoles”).  
Patents of introduction, in other words, allowed third parties to apply for and receive 
patent protection for another’s invention as long as it was novel in the country.  The 
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intent, like ancien regime monopolies, was to provide additional incentives to establish 
novel techniques from abroad.   
  The rhetoric of Spanish law consistently supported the intent of patents of 
introduction.  Its language emphasized that its primary purpose was to promote new 
industries in the country.  Implicitly this emphasis on innovation asserted priority over 
the rights of inventors.  From the broad language of 1820 (“Todo el que invente, 
perfeccione ó introduzca un ramo de industria”) to the introductory sentences of the 
1878 and 1902 laws (“Todo…que pretenda establecer ó haya establecido en los 
dominios españoles una industria nueva…tendrá derecho a la explotación exclusiva”), 
the laws’ general rhetoric and specific provisions favored the commercial exploitation 
of new industry over the protection of inventors’ rights.
21  This bias was reinforced by 
further regulation of patent rights.   
  Second, the Spanish system clearly limited and regulated the scope of all patents 
in order to encourage commercial innovation.  This was especially true for patents of 
introduction.  Most importantly, each law contained a compulsory working clause: it 
threatened revocation of any patent unless the patented object was worked within a 
fixed term (which fluctuated between one and three years over the century).  To work a 
patent meant, according to the 1878 law, “que se ha puesto en práctica en los dominios 
españoles, estableciendo una nueva industria en el país.”  Inventors, in other words, 
only had an exclusive right if they commercially exploited their invention.  This also 
meant, moreover, that foreign inventors and holders of patents of introduction could not 
use their patent to create an exclusive monopoly to import the patented object, but had 
to develop the manufacture or productive use of their patented object in the country.  
The laws were explicit on this.  They offered protection to “ejecutar y poner en practica 
en estos reinos algún objeto, pero no para traerlo hecho de fuera” (in the 1826 law), 
and the 1902 law specified that patents of introduction protect “la fabricación, la 
ejecución o la producción, pero no da facultades para impedir la introducción y venta 
de objetos similares del extranjero.”  Finally, patents of introduction were limited to 
just five years duration.  
  The only significant change to the basic characteristics of Spain’s nineteenth 
century patent system came in the new law of 1878, when the duration and cost of 
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patent protection was substantially altered.
22  The new legislation extended the term of 
patent protection to twenty years (although patents of introduction remained at five 
years).  More importantly, the law slashed the burden posed by the initial patent fees to 
4% of its previous level, from a previous minimum payment of 1,100 reales (250 
pesetas) for a five year term to an initial payment of 10 pesetas, with successive annual 
payments of 20, 30, 40 pesetas and so on to extend protection.
23  The 1878 law also 
explicitly mentioned foreign patentees for the first time, granting them priority if they 
applied for a Spanish patent within two years of their foreign patent.  Spain joined the 
Paris Convention in 1884, ensuring that foreign inventors would be granted “national 
treatment” under Spanish law.  National treatment gave foreign patentees equal 
protection with domestic patentees, and the Convention assured foreign patentees right-
of-priority for a year after the conferral of the original patent.
24     
  In sum, although Spanish law more carefully specified the protection of 
invention and the rights of inventors, the rhetoric of law continued to emphasize the 
broader national goal of establishing new industries.  Spain’s principle means to achieve 
this goal was the combination of patents of introduction and a compulsory working 
clause.  The first allowed any entrepreneur to claim protection for introducing a new 
technique or industry while the second required domestic innovation of any patented 
invention or introduction and prevented foreign patents from protecting import 
monopolies.   
 
2. Mexico 
  Unlike Spain, legal reform in Mexico yielded two significantly different patent 
regimes in the nineteenth century, one running 1832-1890, the next 1890-1910.
25  
TABLE 2 presents a brief summary of the main elements of each phase of Mexican law.   
From independence until 1890 Mexico’s formal patent system differed little 
from Spain’s.  Indeed, upon independence in 1821, Mexico inherited the Spanish patent 
                                                 
22 The laws of 1878 and 1902 went much further than previous legislation to detail administrative and 
adjudicatory processes.  These seems true of many national laws in the late nineteenth century; see the 
British reforms of 1852 and 1883 and Mexico’s reforms of 1890 and 1903, for instance.  Such increased 
attention to the specification of patent law was driven by the rapidly increasing international trade in 
technology in the second half of the century.   
23 Sáiz, 1999b, p. 135. 
24 WIPO/IBIP 1983 p. 216 for the text of the 1883 Paris Convention and its amendments. 
25 The analysis of this paper stops with the end of Porfirian Mexico in the Revolution of 1910, but the 
post-1890 patent system remained in force until the late 1920s.  All quotes are taken from Dublán and 
Lozano, Legislación Mexicana; see Table 2 for specific page references.  For a more detailed account of 
Mexican law and its reform, see Beatty, 1996, though the conclusions here differ.     10
law of 1820, although this was replaced with a new, wholly Mexican but very similar 
law in 1832.  Both the Spanish and Mexican regimes were registration systems, offering 
no examination for novelty or utility, both offered protection to inventions and 
introductions, both had compulsory working clauses (in Mexico after 1843), and both 
made little mention of foreign patentees (until the 1878 law in Spain and the 1890 law 
in Mexico).  Yet subtle and important differences existed between the two. 
  First, Mexican law before 1890 defined patents of introduction far more broadly 
than did Spanish law.  “El introductor de algún ramo de industria,” stated article 21 of 
the 1832 legislation, “que á juicio del congreso general, sea de grande importancia, 
podrá obtener privilegio exclusivo.”  The language of the law permitted the conferral of 
monopoly rights, with no limits specified, to any kind of “important” industry, at the 
discretion of a political body.  Such privileges, though codified, appear little different 
from traditional royal grants of ancien regime systems.  Furthermore, nothing in the 
language of the 1832 law limited patents of invention to discrete technological 
advances, establishing only that exclusive rights could be held by “el que invente ó 
perfeccione alguna industria en la república.”  Broad monopolies could apparently be 
conferred de jure on a wide variety of activities, and on a discretionary basis.   
  Second, Mexican law before 1890 placed less clear and stringent limitations on 
patents generally and patents of introduction particularly.  As we have just seen, patents 
of introduction could in theory be awarded for virtually any kind of economic activity, 
with no restriction on their temporal limit.  Like Spanish law, the language of Mexican 
law emphasized commercial innovation.  While a compulsory working clause was not 
introduced until 1843, the 1832 law required that half of all workers employed by 
patentees be Mexicans, an effort to diffuse the know-how of new techniques.  The 
compulsory working clause of 1843 gave patentees five years to “plantee y comience a 
usar el objeto privilegiado.”  Neither piece of legislation spoke directly of the “rights of 
inventors.”   
  Thus the first Mexican patent regime of the nineteenth century was “modern” in 
the sense that it established a codified, relatively impersonally administered system to 
award temporal monopolies to those who fit certain criteria.  Yet, even more than the 
Spanish system, Mexico’s regime retained elements of ancien privileges, most clearly in 
the specification of patents of introduction in the 1832 legislation which offered the 
discretionary allocation of broadly defined monopolies.  Like Spain, the pre-1890 
regime gave clear priority to commercial innovation over the rights of inventors.      11
  In 1890, after a decade of reform efforts, Mexico replaced the 1832 legislation 
with an entirely new and radically different patent system.
26  First, the new law more 
clearly defined the criteria for patentability: “todo descubrimiento, invención ó 
perfeccionamiento que tenga por objeto un nuevo producto industrial, un nuevo medio 
de producción ó la aplicación nueva de medios conocidos para obtener un resultado ó 
un producto industrial.”  Patents were limited to discrete technological advances.   
Second, the law ended the conferral of patents of introduction.  The object of the patent 
had to be new both in Mexico and abroad.  Patents could only be sought for objects 
publicized or practiced abroad if they were the subject of a foreign patent and if the 
applicant in Mexico was the original inventor or their legal agent.  Only actual 
inventors, domestic or foreign, could defend patent rights.  Third, although the 1890 law 
retained the compulsory working clause, this was dropped by 1896 (and there is not 
indication it had been enforced earlier).  In practice, even before 1896 foreign patentees 
received a five-year monopoly permit to import the patented good; thereafter they could 
do so for the duration of the patent.  There were no other limitations or regulations on 
patent rights in the 1890 law, although a number had been proposed during the reform 
movement of the 1880s.  The new law of 1903 added more detailed specification of 
administrative and adjudicatory procedures but did not alter the essential aspects of the 
post-1890 system.      
  Late-century patent law reform in Mexico also brought substantial change to the 
duration and cost of patent protection.  Like the 1878 Spanish law, in 1890 Mexico 
doubled the term of patent protection from ten to twenty years and moved towards 
reducing the burden of patenting fees.  Until 1890, the Mexican Development Ministry 
charged foreigners patenting fees that were between 30-150% higher than those charged 
to Mexican applicants, although both fell within the broad range specified in the 1832 
legislation (see Table 2).  Fees for both groups of applicants, however, were relatively 
high, as we will see below.  Although the 1890 law narrowed the possible range of 
patent fees, it did not substantially alter the costs for either Mexican or foreign 
applicants.
27  In 1896 the one-time fee was replaced by progressive taxation; all 
                                                 
26 The reform effort began shortly after Porfirio Díaz first took office in 1876; see Soberanis, 1989, p. 
132; Sánchez Flores, 1980, pp. 224-225.  There are indications in the patent record that patents were 
conferred in the 1880s de facto along the lines of the 1890 law although the 1832 legislation remained de 
jure.   
27 What mattered to most foreign applicants was of course the dollar (or pound or franc or mark) value of 
the Mexican peso fee.  Because the silver-based peso depreciated substantially against foreign currencies   12
patentees paid escalating fees ($50, $75, and $100 pesos) to extend protection for each 
successive five years of the twenty year term, and this reform cut the initial patenting 
fee (due to receive conferral) by roughly fifty percent for all applicants.  Finally, 
patenting fees were dramatically reduced in the 1903 law, to $5 pesos for a one year 
provisional patent and $35 pesos for the remaining nineteen years of the full term.  In 
short, relatively high fees persisted until they were moderated in 1896 and reduced 
dramatically in 1903.   
  Until 1890 the intent of patent legislation in Spain and Mexico was roughly 
convergent.  Both wished to take advantage of new technologies and diverse activities 
that had been developed elsewhere.  Their governments were not overly concerned with 
the natural rights of inventors to the “fruits of their genius,” nor even with stimulating 
domestic invention (although these arguments can be found in some liberal rhetoric).  
Instead, both systems sought primarily to encourage investment in innovation, and 
especially in the introduction of new machines, new processes, or new economic 
activities from abroad.  “Patents of introduction” would permit entrepreneurial 
Spaniards or Mexicans to claim exclusive rights to foreign advances, while compulsory 
working clauses and other regulations sought to encourage direct commercialization.  If 
patent monopolies were limited solely to the original inventor, nationals would be 
unable to claim any kind of use-rights to foreign technologies without negotiating some 
form of purchase or licensing with the foreign proprietor.  Mexico, however, abandoned 
this orientation in 1890 and moved instead in the direction of the nineteenth century 
U.S. legislation by favoring investment in invention over investment in innovation.   
This did not mean, however, that Porfirian officials believed the time was ripe to call 
forth the inventive genius of Mexicans.  Rather, they believed that this reform was a 
necessary condition to increase incentives for foreigners to bring their new machines 
and processes to Mexico.
28 
 
III. Law and Patenting Behavior 
  
WHAT, then, were the likely implications of Spanish and Mexican patent law?  Their 
goal, of course, was to create a kind of property—the exclusive right—that would 
                                                                                                                                               
until 1903, the real cost of paying Mexican fees also fell for foreign applicants.  This is captured in the 
analysis in section III, below.   
28 See, for example, the statements made successive Mexican Ministers of Development in the Memoria 
of the Secretaría de Fomento: 1892 volume; 1901-04 volume, p. cxxxii; 1908-09 volume, p. lxxxiii.     13
increase incentives for individuals to invest in the inherently risky and uncertain 
activities of invention, introduction, and innovation.  We can examine the implications 
of the patent system on two levels: first and most directly, in the patent records 
themselves, and second, in patterns of investment in invention and innovation.  The first 
is relatively straightforward; the second more problematic, and will be taken up briefly 
in the last section of this paper. 
  Annual series of patents conferred in Spain and Mexico provide the primary 
evidence for the first relationship, with two adjustments; FIGURES 1 and 2 present the 
data for each country.
 29  First, the series of total patents in each country is divided in 
two, one representing all patents solicited or awarded to nationals, the other representing 
all patents solicited or awarded to foreigners.  These were two populations responded to 
patent law reform in different ways, at least in the Mexican case.
30  Second, although 
figures 1 & 2 present total annual patenting levels, patenting per capita series are used 
in the analyses below, as these better represent patenting behavior—the propensity to 
patent—than the raw patenting series.
31   
Because we are only examining here the relationship between law and patenting 
behavior, we do not yet have to worry about whether the patent data actually reflect 
investment in inventive and/or innovative activity.  We need only recognized that 
patents were an investment for those who sought them, and sometimes a considerable 
one, given fees and other administrative costs.  Like investment in any form of property 
rights, we would expect that legal reforms that increased the potential benefits of 
                                                 
29 Patent applications show inventors’ interest in acquiring patents and reflect their perception concerning 
the changing benefits and costs of patent protection.  Conferred patents are a function of three factors: 
applications (public interest in acquiring patents), the criteria of patentability (the degree to which some 
percentage of applications are denied), the cost of patents (the percentage of applicants who, though 
applicable, fail to make the necessary payment), and of administrative processes (especially the extent to 
which it may take a year or more for applications to be approved and conferred).  Ideally we would 
compare applications in Spain with applications in Mexico.  However, we only have reliable and 
comparable data for conferral.  Moreover, both countries utilized simple registration systems.  See the 
appendix for a complete description of the patent series, their sources and construction.   
30 Work in progress by the authors examines differences in patenting behavior for those patentees resident 
in-country compared to non-residents.  It is likely that this latter division is more significant than the 
domestic-foreign division we analyze here.  
31 For nationals, patents are calculated per million residents.  For foreigners, the per capita figures are 
calculated as the number of foreign patents per two-year cumulative patents issued abroad, in the source 
country(ies) of most foreign patents.  In the Mexican case, U.S. citizens took 50-80% of all patents, so the 
ratio is foreign patents in Mexico to the sum of the previous two years of patents issued in the United 
States (representing the pool of foreign patents available for patenting in Mexico).  For Spain, most 
foreign patents came from France, Britain, Germany, and the U.S..  The U.S. patent series is taken from 
the Annual Report of the United States Commissioner of Patents and French, British, and German series 
from Sáiz, 1999, appendix.     14
holding patent rights and that decreased the cost of acquiring and holding them would 
have induced higher levels of investment.
32   
  Given our discussion of the Spanish and Mexican patent systems in the 
nineteenth century in section II, we would expect these shifts in the patenting trend to 
occur after signficant legal reforms in each country.  In Spain, the only significant 
change in the specification of patent law came in 1878, when the new law formally 
increased the transparency and enforceability of patents, made explicit provisions for 
foreign patentees (and in 1884, by joining the Paris Convention, gave foreign inventors 
priority rights over their inventions in Spain), and dramatically reduced patenting fees.
33  
We would expect that the 1878 reforms would have substantially increased potential 
patentees’ interest in investing in Spanish patent rights, and that the Spanish patenting 
trends (both nationals and foreigners) would exhibit at least an upward shift and perhaps 
also an accelerated growth trend thereafter.   
  Did legal change in Spain increase interest in seeking Spanish patents among 
both Spaniards and foreigners?  If it did, the relationship is a weak one.  As FIGURE 1 
illustrates, patenting by both groups underwent two broad cycles, one running from the 
beginning of our series until about 1864 and the second from the mid 1870s until 1914.  
Patenting grew faster in the first period than it did in the second, although this is in part 
due to the extremely low levels of annual patenting in the 1820s.  TABLE 3 presents 
average annual growth rates for the subperiods.  The depression of patenting between 
1864 and 1874 and its recovery thereafter coincides closely with broader political events 
in Spain and not with the new law of 1878.  The sustained collapse of patenting levels 
began immediately after the fall of O’Donnell’s Liberal Union in 1863 with the 
beginning of the 1864 financial crisis.  There was a brief recovery following the 
implementation of the Constitution of 1869 and renewed depression with the political 
chaos of 1873.  Following the Restoration in 1874, however, patenting grew steeply 
through the rest of the decade before settling into a sustained and stable growth pattern 
over the next three decades.  The  most dramatic change can be seen in the large 
increase of foreign patents taken between the downturn of 1864-74 and the resumption 
                                                 
32 By increasing the strength of patent rights we mean reforms which may have enhanced all or some of 
the following: the specification of what constitutes patentability; the transparency of patent rights and 
their administration; provisions supporting the tradability (e.g. through licensing, or assignment) of patent 
rights; and provisions affecting the enforceability of patent rights.   
33 Note that these were the formal changes made in the statutory law.  The impact of formal law on the 
nature of the patent right depended of course on the administrative and adjudicatory procedures adopted 
by patenting agencies and especially on the way in which the courts adjudicated patent disputes 
(including opposition, infringement, and nullification suits).     15
of steady growth after 1880.  The evidence suggests that investment in patent rights 
reacted strongly to the broader atmosphere of political stability and certainty, growing 
by a factor of almost ten within a decade.  It might be argued that the new patent law of 
1878, with its greater specification and lower costs, played an instrumental role in 
attracting larger numbers of patent investors than before even though the sharp recovery 
from the post-1864 depression clearly predated patent reform.  In other words, it may 
have been that without the new law of 1878, the observable late-century patenting 
growth of 6% per year for nationals and about 5% per year for foreigners would have 
resumed at a lower level, say closer to the 200 applications per year of 1877 than the 
500 of 1879.   
The evidence from our data on patent applications suggests that the legal 
reforms of 1878 may have attracted greater numbers of patentees, leading to a sustained 
higher level of patenting thereafter.  On the other hand, the growth of patenting is in fact 
slower after 1878 than before and it is not at all clear that high patenting levels after 
1878 are not primarily due to the post-restoration combination of political stability and 
general economic growth through 1914 and perhaps especially to the larger supply of 
foreign patents available for patenting in the Spain.  We will explore the possible 
implications for this shift in the next section. 
  In Mexico, the most significant institutional change came with the new law in 
1890, although other reforms which should have affected the relative benefits and costs 
of patent rights occurred on a de facto basis in 1883 and 1887 and de jure in 1896 and 
1903.  These reforms fall in two categories with important implications for our a priori 
expectations of patenting behavior.  In each reform patenting fees underwent change: 
upwards in 1887 and downwards in each of the other years.
34  The initial minimum cost 
of patenting underwent its greatest change in the legal reforms of 1896 (from $100 
pesos to $50) and 1903 (from $50 to $5 pesos).  We would expect that decreasing costs 
would result in an increase in the level of patenting, and vice versa.   
Secondly, the new laws of 1890 and 1903 substantially altered the specification 
of Mexican patent rights.  Both laws substantially increased the specification of 
administrative and adjudicatory procedures with apparent implications for the 
transparency and enforceability of patent rights for any and all patentees.  In addition, 
                                                 
34 As noted above, differential fees were charged to Mexicans and foreigners before 1890, and the peso 
depreciation also altered the dollar burden of patent fees to most foreigners.  Annual series of the 
minimum initial fees take into consideration both the de facto and de jure institutional reforms as well as 
the peso depreciation, and are used in the regression analysis presented below.   16
the rights of foreign inventors were strengthened through the period.  The 1890 law 
made explicit provision for patenting by foreign inventors, the 1896 reform removed the 
compulsory working clause, and in 1903 Mexico joined the Paris Convention, giving 
foreign patentees de jure equal protection and priority rights.  We would expect that 
potential foreign patentees would be increasingly likely to invest in Mexican patent 
protection following these reforms.   
Does patenting behavior in Mexico reflect the expected impact of these legal 
changes?  The patent evidence suggests that each of the legal reforms had little or no 
impact on the propensity of foreigners to seek and acquire Mexican patents, and that 
changes in the cost of patent rights--but not other aspects of the specification—did have 
an affect on Mexicans’ propensity to invest.   
As in Spain, the experience of patenting in Mexico by both Mexicans and 
foreigners can be divided in two broad phases (FIGURE 2 and TABLE 4).  In the first, 
running from the beginning of our data in the early 1850s until 1877, patenting by both 
groups was extremely low and highly erratic—not surprising during an era of rather 
extreme political instability and conflict.  Total annual patents conferred by the 
government rarely exceeded ten and fell to zero in several years.  In contrast, the 
patenting trends of both groups began a long period of steady growth in 1878, with 
annual averages at 13.3% for foreigners and 7.5 for Mexicans.  Also like the Spanish 
experience, the onset of late-century sustained growth pre-dated significant legal reform 
and followed instead on the heels of the restoration of political stability in national 
government—in this case, shortly after the beginning of the government of Porfirio 
Díaz in 1876.  It would be difficult to argue, in other words, that substantial patent law 
reform in the 1890s was responsible for the onset of sustained late-century patenting 
growth.   
  Thus far, the behavior of Mexican and foreign patentees was largely similar.  
Their experience diverges, however, during the era of Porfirian growth.  For foreign 
patentees, the successive legal reforms of the 1880s through 1903 apparently made little 
difference.  The trend of foreign patenting per capita is steadily upward at over 13% per 
year (see TABLE 4), with relatively little fluctuation and no shift in level or trend 
apparent to the eye.  The only short-term depressions in patenting by foreigners 
correspond not to years of legal reform but to years of recession in the Mexican and 
North Atlantic economies: 1893-94 and 1907-08.  There is little change in the slope of 
the patenting trend before or after the 1890, 1896, or 1903 reforms.  Chow test   17
breakpoint analyses of the years of legal reform also show no significant results for 
these years.
35   
  In contrast, while the propensity of Mexicans to seek patents also underwent 
rapid growth over the first ten years of the Porfirian era, Mexican patenting stagnated 
for roughly a decade thereafter (ca. 1887-1897) before resuming steady growth until the 
onset of revolution in 1910.  What accounts for this decade-long stagnation in patenting 
by Mexicans?  It is not coterminous with new laws of 1890 and 1903 which partially 
redefined and largely strengthened the rights of inventors and patentees.  Instead, it 
correlates closely with changes in the cost of acquiring patent protection: with a 34% 
increase in the fees charged Mexicans beginning in mid-1886 and with the 50% 
decrease in initial patenting fees beginning in late 1896.  The single largest one-year 
jump in patenting by Mexicans takes place, furthermore, between 1903 and 1904 when 
the initial fee fell from $50 pesos to just $5.  Mexican patentees, it seems, cared little 
about the legal specification of patent rights, expect for their initial cost.  Again, the 
Chow test confirms these conclusions.
36 
  Why did the patenting fees matter so much to Mexicans and not to foreigners?  
The relative burden of the initial fees on the two groups can be seen in TABLE 5.  
Mexico’s patenting fees likely presented a large obstacle to potential domestic 
patentees, as fees ranged between two and three times annual per capita income until the 
fee reductions of 1896 and 1903 (Column C).  Given the skewed nature of income 
distribution in Porfirian Mexico and the lack of effective capital markets for all but the 
politically connected, this likely meant that patenting was prohibitively expensive for 
most Mexicans.
37  In contrast, the burden of Mexican fees was substantially lower for 
foreign applicants (column G).   
  Formal modeling of patenting behavior as a function of economic and 
institutional variables provides one more way to examine the relationship between 
patenting and legal reform.
38  Our hypothesis is that the propensity to patent, measured 
                                                 
35 None of the years of legal reform return significant results, nor do multiple subperiods (1878-1890-
1903-1910 or 1878-1890-1896-1903-1910).  The only point of structural change found significant in the 
Chow test is the one in the full series (1853-1910) which is readily visible in figure 2: 1878.   
36 Significant results at the 1% level or above are found for the single years 1896 and 1903 within the 
1878-1910 period and for the subperiod division 1878-1887-1896-1903 (F=6.69, probability = 0.00016).  
The results worsen notably if 1890 is added.   
37 See Maurer and Haber, 2002.   
38 This exercise does not assume that every patentee was motivated by the prospects for material gain, but 
only that most were, and so we would expect the aggregate trend to be correlated with these economic 
and institutional conditions.  This assumption is supported by Schmookler, 1966; Dutton, 1984; Sokoloff, 
1988; and Khan, 1995 among others.   18
by yearly patenting per capita, would respond favorably to economic growth (the 
demand for new technologies in the domestic economy), to the supply of knowledge (in 
the case of domestic invention), or the supply of patentable inventions abroad (in the 
case of foreign patentees), and to institutional reforms which strengthened patent rights 
and reduced their cost.    
  In Spain, regressions that examine the impact of these kinds of variables on 
patenting per capita rates generally support this logic.  TABLE 6 offers the results for 
Foreigners patenting in Spain.  First, patenting by foreigners responds positively to both 
economic conditions (proxied by Spanish foreign trade) and to the level of patenting 
abroad.
39  Second, the coefficients for both the effect of the new law of 1878 and the 
political turmoil of 1864-1874 are significant, suggesing that the new law had a large 
positive influence on foreigners’ propensity to patent in Spain, and that the political 
situation preceding the new law significantly dampened their enthusiasm to do so.  For 
Spanish patentees the results are very similar (TABLE 7).  Domestic patenting is 
procyclical, and both political conditions and the specifications of patent law seem to 
have mattered to their decision to invest in Spanish patent protection.   
  The Mexican data present a striking contrast to the Spanish case.  In Mexico, the 
regressions suggest that during the era of patenting growth (1878-1910) foreign 
patentees responded closely to economic growth and to the supply of foreign inventions 
available for patenting there, but they apparently cared little about any aspect of the 
specification of Mexican patent rights.  The results in TABLE 8 are unambiguous: the 
variables capturing economic demand for new technologies and the supply of foreign 
inventions available for patenting in Mexico are significant in each specification.  On 
the other hand, none of the variables capturing aspects of Mexican patent law are 
significant in any specification.  These results confirm our more general discussion 
above. 
  In contrast, Mexican patentees in Mexico apparently cared about at least one 
aspect of patents’ specification: their cost.  The regression results in TABLE 9 suggest 
that without considering institutional issues, economic demand for new technologies 
does not explain the 1878-1910 patenting trend (although the correlation is very strong 
                                                 
39 Note that the coefficients to these two variables become insignificant when used together due to 
multicolinearity effects.   19
for the 1878-87 and 1898-1910 subperiods).
40  Only when variables capturing aspects of 
Mexican patent law are added does trade become significant.  The various legal 
variables suggest that cost mattered, but little else did.  This becomes particularly clear 
in the dummy variables for the three legal reforms.  The 1890 law, which supposedly 
strengthened patentees’ rights, also sustained high fees (at 200% of Mexico’s per capita 
income) and so yields a negative and significant coefficient in specifications 5-7.  In 
general, the regression confirms our conclusion above that by reducing fees Mexico 
attracted more domestic patentees.  Conversely, there is little support for the assertion 
that stronger patent rights attracted more patentees.  This formal modelling cannot 
answer, however, whether all this meant that legal reforms actually induced more 
investment in domestic invention.  We will return to this below.   
  We have argued in section II above that patent systems in many late developing 
countries were distinct from those in the early industrializers.  Those in the former 
group tended to emphasize commercial innovation and promoted technology transfer 
through the use of patents of introduction, compulsory working clauses, and other 
provisions.  The foregoing analysis of the relationship between legal change and 
patenting behavior largely ignored these provisions.  What were the implications of 
these provisions in Spain and Mexico?   
  The evidence available in the patent records support only tentative observations 
on several points.  First, patents of introduction constituted a minority of total patents 
conferred in both countries.  In Spain, patents of introduction comprised between 30 and 
50% of all patents through midcentury.  However, as total patent numbers grew  
rapidly thereafter, the number of applications for introductions held steady, falling 
quickly to 10% or less of all patent applications by the end of the 1870s.
41  In Mexico, 
less than seventy patents of introduction were conferred through the century, 
concentrated in two three-year periods (thirty-three conferred 1855-57 and eighteen in 
1863-65).  Although these introduction patents comprised a significant percentage in 
these periods (38% of all conferred patents 1853-1865), they were otherwise nearly 
absent and only three were issued between 1865 and their abolition in 1890.  Mexicans 
and foreigners each took roughly half of all patents of introduction.  Notably, in both 
countries, the prevalence of introduction patents nearly disappeared at the same time 
                                                 
40 We would ideally include in this model a variable to capture the supply of knowledge in Mexico, such 
as the number of engineers, but such data does not exist for the full period.   
41 Sáiz, 1999, p. 140 gráfica 13.     20
that the respective national economies (and international trade) began growing most 
rapidly.   
Second, compulsory working clauses were apparently ignored in Mexico and 
enforced in Spain.  There is no evidence in the patent records or related sources that 
Mexico’s compulsory working clause of 1843-1896 was ever enforced.  Unlike Spain, 
there was never an established mechanism for ascertaining whether an invention had 
been “put in practice;” perhaps the intent was to use the courts to adjudicate 
nullification suits based on non-working.  If so, we have found no evidence or 
references to such suits.
42  In Spain, by contrast, the law provided for specific 
mechanisms to establish the working of an invention and procedures for declaring 
patents invalid if not worked.  As a consequence, between 1851 and 1878 almost 50% 
of all patents were declared expired on this basis.
43   
  Were patents of introduction an effective means of attracting foreign technology 
that would not otherwise have come?  Probably not, especially given the importance of 
economic demand as indicated in our rough modeling exercises, above.  On the other 
hand, there is little evidence in the patent records that patents of introduction in any way 
discouraged foreign inventors from seeking protection in either country.
44   
Did patents of introduction allow nationals instead of foreigners to play a more 
active role in the introduction and innovation of novel technologies?  Did they provide a 
legal tool with which domestic entrepreneurs could claim a monopoly right to the 
technological creativity of foreigners and commercialize it at home?  Perhaps, although 
the evidence in inconclusive.  There is some evidence that in Spain, introduction patents 
were especially used in the early decades after 1820, and that Spaniards took protection 
on several technologically prominent inventions of foreigners (and likely many less 
prominent ones).  These included Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone, patented in 
Spain as an introduction by a Spaniard one month before Bell sought protection there as 
the inventor, and apparently commercialized by the Spanish patentee in several homes 
and businesses in Barcelona shortly thereafter.
45  In Mexico, there are also cases of 
                                                 
42 There is no reference to such suits, for instance, in the sample of several dozen court cases concerning 
patent rights for which I do have records.   
43 Sáiz, 1999, p. 197 gráfica 28.   
44 If they did, we would expect that when Mexico abolished patents of introduction in 1890 there would 
have been a significant upward shift in foreign patenting, which was not the case, as we noted in the 
analysis above.   
45 Bell, however, successfully registered modifications that effectively carved a comercial space for local 
investment; Sáiz, 1999b, p. 138 n. 195.  In the Catalan heart of Spain’s textile industry, local   21
Mexicans taking an introduction patent for a foreign invention and, some years later, 
taking an invention patent for a related technique.  Such experiences—though few and 
far between—suggest a process of introduction, stimulation, adaptation, and subsequent 
domestic innovation, all supported by the particular specification of patent law—just the 
objective of such provisions.  If, however, a domestic holder of a patent of introduction 
delays the ability of the foreign inventor to commercialize the technology, and the 
foreign inventor is interested in direct investment, has deeper pockets than the domestic 
introducer, and is thus better able to finance the innovation and diffusion of the new 
technology, then the patent of introduction has posed an obstacle to technological 
progress.  Which scenario predominated is as yet unclear from several anecdotal cases.  
In either case, the presence or absence of protective tariffs would have decisively 
shaped incentives to either commercialize or to import.   
Finally, were compulsory working clauses an effective way to promote 
commercial innovation?  In Mexico, the answer has to be no, given the failure to 
enforce.  In Spain, it is more difficult to say.  The rate at which patents were revoked for 
failure to work suggests that this clause effectively denied holders of foreign patents 
from using them as exclusive import franchises, as was possible in Mexico.  More 
definitive conclusions on these issues must await more focused case studies.   
 
IV. Conclusions: Law, Patents, and Investment in New Technology 
 
HOWEVER CLOSE the relationship between the legal specification of patent rights and 
patenting behavior—our primary focus in the previous section—the relationship 
between law and investment in new technologies is more tenuous.  Patent statistics only 
weakly reflect investment in inventive activity; even less do they reflect actual levels of 
investment in innovative activity.   
  If, as we concluded in the previous section, the specification of patent law is 
only weakly related to the propensity to patent in late-developing countries, then its 
relation with inventive or innovative activity must also be very weak, at best.  Lets 
examine the foreign and domestic cases separately.  There is little reason to expect that 
the specification of Mexican patent law would influence the rate of inventive activity 
                                                                                                                                               
entrepreneurs widely used patents of introduction to protect investment in new and imported machines; 
see Sáiz, 1999a.    22
abroad.
46  Most inventive activity there was geared initially to opportunities in the 
domestic (U.S.) market, even if it developed substantial foreign interests as well.  In 
cases where foreign markets did provide an important motivation for invention, the 
absence of any relationship between patent law and foreign patenting (in the foreign 
country) suggests that those foreigners who sought patents abroad cared little about the 
exact nature of patent protection.  For the vast majority, sales was their business.
47  
Acquiring foreign patent rights around the globe served two possible functions: it 
enabled sales at monopoly prices and it prevented competitors from acquiring 
monopolies.  In neither case was holding a foreign patent likely necessary to motivate 
pursuit of these sales opportunities.   
  Did patent law influence domestic inventive activity?  We saw above that the 
relatively weak relationship between legal reform and domestic patenting suggests that 
patent law may have induced greater numbers of Mexican patentees.  If so, did this also 
mean it induced more investment in inventive activity?  In other words, as legal reform 
expands patenting (box B in FIGURE 3), does it also expand invention (box A), or does 
patenting (box B) simply expand to encompass more of the existing level of invention 
(box A)?
48  At present we do not have enough evidence to answer this question. 
  What about patent law and investment in innovative activity—in the commercial 
use of new technologies?  Here we are primarily concerned about the question of 
technology transfer.  Did the particular specification of Spanish and Mexican patent law 
through the nineteenth century promote the introduction and innovation of foreign 
techniques?  More specifically, did laws which included patents of introduction and 
compulsory working clauses yield greater investment in this area, or does the evidence 
suggest that a patent system geared more toward protecting inventors’ rights (like 
Mexico after 1890) yielded greater investment than otherwise?   
  Again, our patent data shed direct light only on investment in patents and only 
indirectly on investment in commercial innovation.  The patent data make possible 
several observations.  First, the use of patents of introduction virtually disappeared in 
both countries during the era of most rapid economic (and presumably technological) 
                                                 
46 This is likely even if we consider patent protection in the rest of the world relative to U.S. invention.  
Penrose concurs (Penrose, 1951).   
47 See, for example, Wilkins, 1970 and 1998.   
48 Note that the fact that several thousand Mexican inventors invested in patents protection through the 
period is not in itself sufficient evidence: everyone wants to be a monopolist, especially when a monopoly 
can be had cheaply, as after 1903.  The question is whether there would have been less investment in 
inventive activity by Mexicans absent patent protection.     23
growth after midcentury.  In Spain, this occurred well before any institutional change 
affecting patents of introduction.
49  In Mexico it also significantly predated their legal 
abolition in 1890.  While there is some evidence that patents of introduction may have 
allowed some Spaniards and a few Mexicans to acquire monopoly rights to exploit a 
novel foreign technique—perhaps to a significant degree in pre-1850 Spain—these 
cases were relatively few and played little or no role during the era of late-century 
economic growth.  Second, compulsory working clauses were effectively applied in 
Spain through the century, but not in Mexico.  Such provisions, we should note, were 
essentially negative: they likely played little role in promoting innovation but, when 
applied, they may have prevented non-worked patents from restraining competitive 
innovation or from protecting an import monopoly.  Finally, there is little indication in 
the patent records that Mexico’s adoption of a pro-invention patent system after 1890 
effectively promoted higher levels of investment in technology transfer.  If it did, we 
would expect this to be reflected in higher levels of foreign patenting (few would 
forsake the opportunity of acquiring a cheap and effective monopoly).  As we noted 
above, however, there is not such indication in the patenting trend.   
  So where does this leave us?  Although we know that patenting, domestic 
invention, technology transfer, and the commercialization  of new productive 
technologies all accelerated in nineteenth century Spain and Mexico (at least beginning 
sometime after midcentury), there is relatively little indication in the evidence utilized 
here that patent law had much influence over the investment behind these trends.   
Ultimately, firmer conclusions will need to be based on detailed case studies of specific 
technologies, industries, and sectors.  These will provide a more effective way to 
examine and test the relationship between patent law, patent rights, and—most 
importantly—actual investment in invention, importation, and technological innovation 
in Spain and Mexico.   
                                                 
49 Although Spanish law continued to offer them through the century, the priority right which foreign 
inventors gained with the new law of 1878 and Spain’s adhesion to the Paris Convention in 1884 limited 
the degree to which third parties could apply for introduction patents.   24
APPENDIX. Patenting Levels and Classes: Data Sources and Classification 
 
 
1.  Spain (Patricio Sáiz) 
The most important source for research on the Spanish Patent System is provided by the 
original files in the Archives of the Oficina Española de Patentes y Marcas (OEPM) in 
Madrid. This documentation contents administrative data (application, grant, dates, 
compulsory working facts, licences, etc.) as well as technical descriptions and drawings. 
Between 1826 and 1878 there were more than 5,000 patents recorded, which have been 
indexed and widely analyzed in Sáiz, 1999b. From 1878 to 1914 we have around 60,000 
applications, indexed and studied by a research team (directed by J. P. Sáiz and F. 
Cayón) within the framework of an agreement between the OEPM and the Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid. More information and access to both databases can be found at 
http://www.oepm.es. Our work to complete and disaggregate the Spanish series of 
applications and grants according to nationality and residence was still underway when 
this paper was written.  Further work on this data is now available in Sáiz, 2005b and at 
http://www.oepm.es. From 1886 onwards it is also possible to obtain data from indirect 
sources such as the Boletín Oficial de la Propiedad Industrial (OEPM, 1886-nowadays) 
and some other publications (see WIPO, 1983 or Federico, 1964). 
 
2.  Mexico (Edward Beatty) 
BECAUSE no single source contains data on all patents issued in Mexico through the 
long nineteenth century, I reconstructed a patenting series based on multiple sources, 
cross-checking listings to separate conferred patents from applications and to fill gaps in 
the coverage of each source. 
  For the period 1850-1890 I began with the catalogue compiled and published by 
Soberanís ("Catálogo de patentes"), which contains all patents for which files exist in 
the national archives.  However, this excludes many patents for which no 
documentation remains, and for others fails to distinguish between applications and 
conferrals.  I remedied these problems by compiling all patent conferrals listed in the 
annual volumes of Dublán and Lozano's Legislación Mexicana and those published in 
the various volumes of the Memorias of the Development Ministry from 1857 through 
the 1890s.   
  For the period 1890 to October 1903 I compiled all conferred patents from the 
daily editions of the Diario Oficial de la Federación (totally roughly 4,300 newspaper   25
editions).  For each patent, the database includes the name(s) of the inventor(s), a brief 
description of the patent, the date of issue, and the patent number.  Most patents also 
contain information on the residence and nationality of the patentee as well as on patent 
renewals, terms, fees, and classifications.  Finally, I compiled a catalogue of patents 
issued between 1903 and 1910 from the monthly editions of the Gaceta Oficial de 
Patentes y Marcas, published by the Patent Office within the Development Ministry.  
Yearly totals for 1904-1910 are taken from the summaries published by the Mexican 
Patent Office. 
  Distinguishing foreign from Mexican patentees was far from straight-forward.  
Published notices of patent conferrals before 1904 did not note the nationality of 
patentees, but fortunately the original letters of applications, published separately in the 
Diario Oficial, frequently referred to nationality.  After compiling this data and adding 
it to the database, those still lacking nationality (just over 50%) who had non-Spanish 
surnames were cross checked with listings of patentees in the U.S. Patent Office's 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents.  As a result, nationality is definitely 
known for 85% of all patentees before 1904.  The remainder were classified as Mexican 
if they had Spanish surnames, and as generically foreign if they did not.  As patentees 
from Spain were rare, and Mexican patentees with non-Spanish surnames were few, this 
appears justified. 
  Official totals for Mexican and foreign patentees after 1904 show Mexican 
patenting at nearly twice their pre-1904 levels.  These counts apparently designated 
foreigners as Mexican if they did not provide information on nationality in the patent 
applications.  To correct this I took the percentages of Mexican and foreign patents from 
one sample of roughly 2,400 patents conferred between 1904 and 1910 (24.6% Mexican 
and 76.4% foreign) and applied these percentages to the total number of patents 
conceded for those years.  These percentages roughly match the average distribution for 
the 1890-1903 period, but they hide any yearly variation in the distribution that might 
have existed after 1904.    
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TABLE 1 
 











“A new machine, aparatus, 
instrument, process, or mechanical or 
chemical operation.” 
“A new machine, aparatus, instrument, 
process, or mechanical or chemical 





Same, but not necessarily new, if not 
yet established in Spain. 
Same, but not necessarily new or of 
own invention, if not yet established or 
practiced in Spain.  
 
Compulsory 
   working 
 
Yes, w/in 1 year. 
   (two years between 1820-26) 
Yes, w/in 2 years. 
   (extended to 3 yrs in 1902) 
Term 
 
Inventions – 5, 10, or 15 years 
   depending on the payment; 
Introductions – 5 years 
  (w/ moderate extentions poss.) 
 
Inventions – 20 years 
 
Introductions – 5 years 
Cost 
 
250 pesetas for 5 years; 750 for 
   10 years; 1500 for 15 years. 
750 pesetas for Introductions. 
 
Annual payments: 10, 20, 30, 40 pesetas 
   & etc. to 200 at 20 years.   
Foreign  
   patentees 
 
Pre-1878: same rights as nationals, 
without priority. 
1884: Terms of Paris Convention. 
 
Source: The original legal texts published in Sáiz, 1996.   
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TABLE 2 
 











“He who invents or improves any 
industry in the Mexican Republic.” 
“Every discovery, invention, or 
improvement of a new industrial 
product, a new method of production or 
the new application of known methods 





“The introducer of any branch of 
industry that is of great importance in 




   working 
 
Added in 1843 (term indeterminate).  Yes, w/in 5 years. 
Abolished in 1896.   
Term 
 
Inventions – 10 years; 
Improvements – 6 years; 
Introductions – indeterminate. 
 
20 years; extendable for 5 additional. 
Cost 
 
From $10 to $300 pesos; criteria 
   unspecified, with differential fees 
   charged de facto to nationals and 
   foreigners; see text.   
 
1890: $50-150 pesos; 
1896: 5-year installments of $50, $50,  
   $75, and $100. 
1903:  $5 pesos for first year; $35 for 
   remainder. 
 
Foreign  
   patentees 
 
No mention.  1890: Explicit inclusion; 
1903: Terms of Paris Convention. 
 
Source:  Dublán and Lozano, Legislación Mexicana, vol. 2, pp. 427-428; vol. 4, p. 706; vol. 6, 
pp. 219-220; vol. 20, pp. 179-183; vol. 26, p. 213; vol. 35, pp. 864-879.   
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Notes: see text and appendix for sources.   
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Notes: see text and appendix for sources. 
 




Patenting in Spain: Growth Trends in Patents Conferred to Spaniards and Foreigners 
 
  (Average Annual growth; R2 in parentheses) 
 
 
 Spaniards   Foreigners 
   
1826-1907  6.3%  (0.91)  8.4%  (0.93) 
   
1826-1864  6.2%  (0.80)  11.5%  (0.90) 
1878-1907  6.0%  (0.93)  4.9%   (0.73) 
   
 
 
Notes:  growth trends calculated using OLS regressions of the log of total patent applications 
on a time series.  See the appendix for the source of patenting data.   
 




Patenting in Mexico:  Growth Trend in Patents Conferred to  
Mexicans and Foreigners 
 





1853-1878  -0.3%  (0.001)   -14.7%   (0.60) 
 
1878-1910 7.5%  (0.67)    13.3%   (0.94) 
 __________ 
 
 1878-1886  22.7%  (0.86) 
 1878-1890     19.5%    (0.83) 
 1887-1896  -5.6%  (0.46) 
 1891-1910     12.6%    (0.93) 





Notes: growth trends calculated using OLS regressions of the log of total patent 
applications on a time series.  See the appendix for the source of patent data. 





Patenting Costs in Mexico for Mexicans and Foreigners, 1880-1905 
 
 
  For Mexican Applicants   For  Foreign  Applicants    













































1885  25 40 63%    30 25 203  12% 
1890  100 50  200%    150 125 201 62% 
1895  100 58  172%    100 52  200 26% 
1900  50 85 59%    50 24 290  8% 
1905  5 135  4%    5 2.5  382  1% 
 
 
Sources and Notes:  See text and appendix for source of and comments on the Mexican 
peso fees.  Mexican per capita income estimated from the figures for 1875, 1895, and 
1910 in Coatsworth, 1990, p. 117.  Fees converted to U.S. dollars using the exchange 
rate in INEGI, 1994, series 20.6.  U.S. per capita income estimated from Historical 
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Table 6:   
 
Patenting in Spain by Foreigners: Determinants of Per Capita Patent Conferrals 1848-1907.   
 
 (t-statistic in parentheses) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
N  60 60 60 60 60 60 
R
2  .68 .61 .68 .93 .93 .80 
Adj R
2  .68 .60 .67 .92 .93 .79 
d  0.31 0.27 0.31 1.16 1.16 0.59 






















































Notes:  Dependent variable: Log of patents taken by Foreigners in Spain per 2-year cumulative sum of patents 
taken in France, Britain, Germany, and the US.  Trade = log of current value of Spanish imports plus exports; 
Foreign patents = 2-year cumulative sum of patents issued in France, Britain, Germany, and the US; Law 78 = a 
dummy variable, taking “0” before the reform and “1” thereafter; pol = a dummy variable, taking “1” during the 
years of political disruption, 1864-74, and “0” otherwise.      
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Table 7: 
 
Patenting in Spain by Spaniards: Determinants of Per capita Patent Conferrals 1848-1907. 
 
 (t-statistic in parentheses) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
N  60 60 60 60 
R
2  .79 .90 .92 .88 
Adj R
2  .78 .90 .92 .87 
d  0.24 0.56 0.55 0.43 


































Notes:  Dependent variable: Log of patents taken by Spaniards per million Spanish population (population 
figures from Estadísticas Históricas de España).  Trade = log of total current value of Spanish imports and 
exports; law 78 = a dummy variable, taking “0” before the reform and “1” thereafter; pol = a dummy variable, 
taking “1” during the years of political disruption, 1864-74, and “0” otherwise.  
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Table 8:   
 
Patenting in Mexico by Foreigners: Determinants of Per capita Patent Conferrals 1878-1910.   
 
 (t-statistic in parentheses) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
N  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R
2  .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 
Adj R
2  .96 .96 .96 .96 .96 .96 .96 
d  2.05 2.08 2.05 2.05 2.19 2.14 2.10 



















































fee   -0.002 
(-1.20) 
 














































Notes:  Dependent variable: Log of patents taken by Foreigners per 2-year cumulative US patents.  Trade = log of 
total current value of imports plus exports between Mexico and the United States (see Beatty, 2000); uspat = 2-
year cumulative series of U.S. patents (e.g. 1888=1887+1888); fee = annual series of peso fees charged foreigners 
converted to U.S. dollars at the going exchange; pvala = patent term/patent fee; pvalb = pvala + the legal dummy 
variables; law90, 96, and 03 = dummy variables, taking “0” before the reform and “1” thereafter.  OLS regression.   
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Table 9: 
 
Patenting in Mexico by Mexicans: Determinants of Per capita Patent Conferrals 1878-1910. 
 
 (t-statistic in parentheses) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
N  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R
2  .86 .86 .87 .86 .90 .90 .90 
Adj R
2  .85 .85 .85 .84 .88 .88 .88 
d  2.04 2.09 2.35 2.30 2.28 2.30 2.26 

































fee   -.009 
(-0.25) 
 














































Notes:  Dependent variable: Log of patents taken by Mexicans per million Mexicans (population figures from 
INEGI, 1995).  Trade = log of total current value of imports plus exports between Mexico and the United States 
(see Beatty, 2000); fee = annual series of peso fees charged Mexicans; pvala = patent term/patent fee; pvalb = 
pvala + the legal dummy variables; law90, 96, and 03 = dummy variables, taking “0” before the reform and “1” 



















Note:   A minus C = unpatented inventions 
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